Kaczynski and Putin’s alliance without friendship
By Maciej
Kisilowski 23 Jul 2021
It is wrong
to assume that Europe's far-right are divided in their attitudes to Putin's
Russia, writes Maciej Kisilowski.
Maciej
Kisilowski is Associate Professor of Law and Strategy at Central European
University.
As more
than a dozen far-right parties joined forces early July to blast EU
integration, a conventional wisdom is still that these parties are deeply
divided on a host of issues. Key among them is, supposedly, the attitude
towards Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
That
conventional wisdom is wrong. Among the signatories of the July statement, all
but one party is decidedly pro-Putin, and that one holdout — Poland’s ruling
PiS — may be just undergoing a subtle change in its attitudes.
In June,
Ryszard Terlecki, one of PiS’s leaders, shocked even the conservative media in
Poland by launching a vicious twitter attack against Sviatlana Tsihanouskaya,
the leader of Belarusian democratic opposition. Last week, the news broke about
talks by Polish billionaire Zygmunt Solorz-Zak with the Hungarian state-owned
energy company MVM and its Russian counterparts on a possible construction of a
nuclear power plant in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.
Reportedly,
PiS’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has been fully informed. If completed,
that project would essentially copy the controversial Russo-Hungarian Paks II
development, with the added twist of outsourcing the plant just across the EU
border.
Independent
journalists in Poland have long accused some PiS politicians of suspicious ties
to Moscow and Russian security agencies of helping to orchestrate mid-2010
political scandals which paved the way to PiS’s 2015 electoral victory. But it
is not these alleged shady connections, but the perfectly transparent change in
PiS’s political fortunes that may push the party into an uneasy alliance with
Vladimir Putin.
Joe Biden’s
electoral victory in the United States leaves PiS acutely isolated on the
international stage. Just as PiS head Jaroslaw Kaczynski signed the European
far-right declaration, his party introduced a bill that would effectively
expropriate the main independent TV station, TVN. TVN, however, is owned by
Discovery Inc. and the reaction of the State Department has been fierce. It is
difficult to imagine how low Warsaw-Washington relations will fall if the major
American media conglomerate is indeed pushed out of Poland.
Relations
with the Western EU partners are, likewise, at the rock bottom. Last week,
Poland’s grotesquely politicised Constitutional Court declared, in a clumsy
ruling, a broad swath of jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
unconstitutional under the Polish law. Last month, Angela Merkel reportedly
refused to meet with her Polish counterparts for the customary celebration of
the anniversary of the historic border treaty between the two countries.
Politically,
however, PiS may not have a choice but to accelerate its authoritarian course,
even if it broadens the rift with the Western partners. Especially in the COVID
era, the inherent contradiction of championing quick economic recovery and
catering to religious fundamentalists opposed to vaccinations, can only be
resolved by silencing independent journalists who ask tough questions and
forcing judges to take a harder line on the opposition.
Donald
Trump’s 2020 defeat highlights the stakes for populists at the time of the
pandemic. If PiS destroys TVN, the only remaining private TV station of
national significance will be Polsat — an increasingly government-friendly
broadcaster owned by Mr. Solorz-Zak, the above-mentioned billionaire working on
the Kaliningrad powerplant project.
At a deeper
level, Mr. Kaczynski and Mr. Putin are natural allies as their political
visions align almost perfectly. While Victor Orban is a rather unconvincing
latecomer in the Christian fundamentalist camp, Kaczynski has for decades
endorsed a vision of a regressive state propped up by Poland’s heavily
nationalistic Catholic church. This vision echoes closely the role of the
Russian Orthodoxy championed by the Kremlin. Both church-state relations
produce precisely the same list of convenient enemies, starting with LGBTI
people and feminist women.
Kaczynski
must understand that the mainstream West will never accept his regressive
vision as compatible with European values. While the EU has been slow in
responding to technical violations of the rule of law, it may act much more
swiftly when basic human rights are at stake.
Lastly, and
perhaps most importantly, those who discount the possibility of the PiS-Putin
alliance fail to realize a peculiar way in which right-wing populists
understand the very concept of “an alliance.” Liberal democracies or even
communist dictatorships of the twentieth century were internationalist in their
outlook. Their geopolitical alliances depended on at least a veneer of
friendship.
With their
Darwinian narratives about world relations, right-wing populists carved for
themselves a new possibility of an alliance without friendship or, perhaps,
even with a level of ostensible enmity.
Donald
Trump charted the way here. To his base, Trump, portrayed his Russia policies
not as an alliance or even rapprochement in a traditional sense, but as a kind
of ruthless realpolitik based on the general insistence that “we do not want to
be the suckers anymore.” Throughout his tenure, he almost obsessively focused
on a narrow point of Putin being a “strong leader” in “a system I don’t happen
to like.” His outreach to Putin was always couched in terms of uber-pragmatic
national self-interest. “We’ll see how it works,” he said at a 2016 rally.
“Maybe we’ll have a good relationship. Maybe we’ll have a horrible
relationship.”
Other
autocrats borrowed from this playbook. “No country can change its address,”
said Victor Orban bluntly during Vladimir Putin’s 2019 visit to Hungary. “Every
country is located where God created it. For Hungary, it means being in a
Moscow-Berlin-Istanbul triangle.”
Unless he
is toppled by the twin impact of COVID and Donald Tusk re-energizing the
democratic opposition, Kaczynski may be tempted to pursue the same path. If the
liberal West moves to more aggressively reject authoritarian, intolerant
peripheral states such as Poland, PiS’s paranoid base, may accept that, in the
world of no friends, Putin may be the least bad of their enemies.

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