Hungary:
5 key questions about the EU’s most important election of 2026
Hungarians
head to the polls in April — and, unusually, someone besides PM Viktor Orbán
has a chance to win.
January
15, 2026 4:01 am CET
By Ketrin
Jochecová and Max Griera
Hungary’s
campaign stepped up a gear this week, with populist nationalist Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán facing the toughest challenge yet to his 15-year grip on power.
The long-suffering opposition hopes that Péter Magyar — conservative leader of
the opposition Tisza party, which is running 12 points ahead in the polls — can
overturn what Orbán himself styles as Hungary’s “illiberal democracy.”
For many
Hungarians, the election is a referendum on Orbán’s model. Under his leadership
the government, led by Orbán’s Fidesz party, has tightened its grip on the
media and state companies — sparking accusations of cronyism — while weakening
judicial independence and passing legislation that sent Hungary plunging down
transparency rankings. It now sits at the bottom of the World Justice Project’s
rule-of-law index for EU countries.
The
62-year-old Orbán is the EU leader closest to Russian dictator Vladimir Putin
and proves a continual obstacle to efforts by Brussels to build a united front
against the Kremlin. He has repeatedly clashed with the EU on topics ranging
from LGBTQ+ rights to migration. Predicting the end of the liberal multilateral
order, Orbán kicked off the year by saying the EU would “fall apart on its
own.”
But can
Magyar — whose surname literally means “Hungarian” — really topple his former
ally? And even if he does, how far could he realistically guide Hungary back
toward liberal democracy with Orbán’s state architecture still in place?
POLITICO
breaks down the five key questions as Hungary heads toward the seismic April 12
vote.
1. Why
should I care?
Hungary
may be relatively small, with a population of 9.6 million, but under Orbán’s
leadership it has become one of the EU’s biggest headaches. He has long
weaponized Budapest’s veto in Brussels to block Russia-related sanctions, tie
up financial aid to Ukraine and repeatedly stall urgent EU decisions.
He is
also a key — and sometimes leading — member of a group of right-wing populists
in EU capitals, who unite on topics such as opposition to migration and
skepticism toward arming Ukraine. Without Orbán, Czechia’s Andrej Babiš and
Slovakia’s Robert Fico would cut far more isolated figures at summits of the
European Council.
Brussels
has often resorted to elaborate workarounds to bypass Hungary’s obstructionism,
and Orbán’s persistent defiance has led to calls to ditch the unanimity rule
that has been in place for decades.
“You have
heard me 20 times regret, if not more, the attitude of Viktor Orbán, who, every
time we had to move forward to help Ukraine … has used his veto to do more
blackmail,” EU liberal party chief Valérie Hayer told journalists Tuesday.
2. What
are the main battlegrounds?
Magyar
accuses Orbán and Fidesz of nepotism and corruption — of weakening the
country’s economy by favoring oligarchs — and of missing out on EU funds by
antagonizing Brussels.
Orbán
wants to frame his arch-nemesis Magyar as a puppet controlled by Brussels.
In the
past year, Fidesz has launched public debates aiming to divide Magyar’s base —
which spans green and left-wing voters to disenchanted former Orbán loyalists —
on subjects such as the LGBTQ+ Pride ban.
Tisza’s
strategy has been to avoid positioning itself on controversial issues, in an
effort to garner an absolute majority that will grant the party power to reform
electoral law, which they say Orbán rigged to his benefit, and enable
constitutional changes.
Tisza’s
No. 2, Zoltán Tarr, told POLITICO he expected Orbán’s government to deploy “all
possible dirty tricks.”
“State
propaganda smears, AI-generated fakes, doctored videos, potential staged
incidents, blackmail, and exploiting the rigged electoral system. They will
mobilize everything because they have so much to lose,” Tarr said.
Speaking
at Fidesz’s party congress on Saturday, Orbán lambasted Tisza as a pro-EU
stooge.
“If you
vote for Tisza or DK [the social democratic Democratic Coalition], you are
voting against your own future. Tisza and DK will carry out Brussels’ demands
without batting an eyelid. Do not forget that Tisza’s boss is Herr Weber,
Europe’s biggest warmonger,” Orbán said, referring to the German chief of the
European People’s Party, Manfred Weber.
3. How
and when does the election take place?
The
national election will take place on Sunday, April 12. Voters will choose a new
199-seat National Assembly under Hungary’s mixed electoral system, with 106 MPs
elected in single-member constituencies and 93 from national party lists.
POLITICO’s
Poll of Polls shows Tisza leading with 49 percent support ahead of Fidesz at 37
percent — with Orbán’s party having been trailing for almost a year now.
Although
the official campaign period begins Feb. 21, the race has effectively been in
full swing for months.
Other
notable parties in the race are the Democratic Coalition (DK); the far-right Mi
Hazánk (Our Homeland) movement; and the satirical Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog
Party (MKKP), largely created to mock Orbán’s policies. But these are fighting
for survival as they may not meet the threshold of support for winning seats in
parliament — meaning the Hungarian legislature could be exclusively controlled
by two right-wing parties.
4. Can
the election be free and fair?
Challengers
to the ruling party face a system designed to favor Fidesz. In 2011 Orbán’s
government redrew electoral districts and overhauled the voting system to
maximize its chances of winning seats.
“There is
no direct interference with the act of voting itself, yet the broader
competitive environment — both in terms of institutional rules and access to
resources — tilts heavily in favor of the governing parties,” said political
analyst Márton Bene at the TK Institute of Political Science in Budapest.
In
addition to controlling roughly 80 percent of the media market, the government
allows ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries (who tend to favor Fidesz) to
vote by mail, whereas those living abroad who have kept their Hungarian
addresses must travel to embassies to cast their ballots.
“One side
enjoys access to the full resources of the state, while the challenger receives
no public campaign funding and has virtually no presence in state-controlled
media,” said political scientist Rudolf Metz from the TK Institute, adding that
this imbalance is partially offset in the digital sphere.
But even
the unfair conditions don’t preclude a Magyar victory, Bene says, as long as
the integrity of the voting process is preserved.
5. How
much would a Magyar win really change?
The
Brussels establishment is praying for Magyar to win, hoping a Tisza government
will deepen ties with the EU.
Centrist
chief Hayer said her party supported “any candidate who will carry pro-European
values, who will be able to beat” the incumbent Hungarian prime minister.
Conservative
boss Weber quickly welcomed Tisza into the center-right family to secure
influence in Budapest and to give them resources to develop their electoral
platform. He has repeatedly framed Magyar as the man who will save Hungary from
Orbán.
While
viewed as a potential bridge-builder for the strained Brussels-Budapest
relationship, Magyar is by no means an unwavering EU cheerleader. He has been
noncommittal about Brussels, considering that any rapprochement could be used
by Orbán against him. In an interview with POLITICO in October 2024 he said “we
certainly don’t believe in a European superstate.”
On the
domestic front, Tarr — Tisza’s No. 2 — told POLITICO the party wants to “keep
[the] border fence, oppose mandatory migration quotas and accelerated Ukraine
accession, pursue peace, fight Russian propaganda, strengthen V4 [Hungary,
Poland, Czechia and Slovakia] and Central Europe without being Europe’s bad
boy.”
That
echoes the prognosis of political scientist Metz, who said a victory by Magyar
“would not mean a radical U-turn or a return to some idealized past.”
“Hungary’s
role as the EU’s permanent disruptor would probably fade, not because national
interests disappear, but because they would be pursued through negotiation and
institutional engagement rather than constant veto politics and symbolic
conflict,” Metz added.
Analysts
also cautioned that change at home could be slow. Zoltán Vasali of Milton
Friedman University said dismantling the current system would be “legally and
institutionally challenging.”
“Core
constitutional bodies will retain their mandates beyond the upcoming elections,
and key positions remain held by individuals aligned with the current
government, limiting near-term change,” Vasali said.
The scale
of a Magyar victory could be decisive. A two-thirds parliamentary
supermajority, which would allow the new government to change the constitution,
Metz said, would be “a game-changer.”
“It would
give a Magyar government the legal capacity to restore core elements of the
rule of law, rebuild checks and balances, and introduce safeguards such as term
limits for key offices,” he said.
Kinga
Gál, Fidesz’s leader in the European Parliament, did not reply to a request for
comment by the time of publication.

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