Would
Donald Trump’s tariffs hurt US consumers?
26 November
2024
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20myx1erl6o
Ben Chu
BBC Verify
policy and analysis correspondent
Donald Trump
has said he will impose new tariffs on goods entering the US from Canada,
Mexico and China on his first day in office.
The US
president-elect said he would sign an executive order for a 25% tariff - or tax
on imports - on all goods coming from Canada and Mexico, to get both countries
to crack down on illegal immigration and drug trafficking.
He has also
vowed to hit goods coming from China with a 10% tariff "above any
additional tariffs" until it cuts fentanyl smuggling. He has already
pledged to target the country with a 60% rate, and has mulled a 200% tax on
some car imports.
Tariffs are
a central part of Trump's economic vision - he sees them as a way of growing
the US economy, protecting jobs and raising tax revenue.
During his
election campaign, he told voters that the taxes were "not going to be a
cost to you, it’s a cost to another country".
That was
almost universally regarded by economists as misleading.
How do
tariffs work?
In practical
terms, a tariff is a domestic tax levied on goods as they enter the country,
proportional to the value of the import.
So a car
imported to the US with a value of $50,000 (£38,000) subject to a 25% tariff,
would face a $12,500 charge.
The charge
is physically paid by the domestic company that imports the goods, not the
foreign company that exports them.
So, in that
sense, it is a straightforward tax paid by domestic US firms to the US
government.
Over the
course of 2023, the US imported around $3,100bn of goods, equivalent to around
11% of US GDP.
And tariffs
imposed on those imports brought in $80bn in that year, around 2% of total US
tax revenues.
The question
of where the final “economic” burden of tariffs falls, as opposed to the
upfront bill, is more complicated.
If the US
importing firm passes on the cost of the tariff to the person buying the
product in the US in the form of higher retail prices, it would be the US
consumer that bears the economic burden.
If the US
importing firm absorbs the cost of the tariff itself and doesn’t pass it on,
then that firm is said to bear the economic burden in the form of lower profits
than it would otherwise have enjoyed.
Alternatively,
it is possible that foreign exporters might have to lower their wholesale
prices by the value of the tariff in order to retain their US customers.
In that
scenario, the exporting firm would bear the economic burden of the tariff in
the form of lower profits.
All three
scenarios are theoretically possible.
But economic
studies of the impact of the new tariffs that Trump imposed in his first term
of office between 2017 and 2020 suggest most of the economic burden was
ultimately borne by US consumers.
A survey by
the University of Chicago in September 2024 asked a group of respected
economists whether they agreed with the statement that "imposing tariffs
results in a substantial portion of the tariffs being borne by consumers of the
country that enacts the tariffs, through price increases". Only 2%
disagreed.
Raising
prices
Let’s use a
concrete example.
Trump
imposed a 50% tariff on imports of washing machines in 2018.
Researchers
estimate the value of washing machines jumped by around 12% as a direct
consequence, equivalent to $86 per unit, and that US consumers paid around
$1.5bn extra a year in total for these products.
There is no
reason to believe the results of even higher import tariffs from a future Trump
administration would be any different in terms of where the economic burden
would fall.
The
non-partisan Peterson Institute for International Economics has estimated
Trump’s new proposed tariffs would lower the incomes of Americans, with the
impact ranging from around 4% for the poorest fifth to around 2% for the
wealthiest fifth.
A typical
household in the middle of the US income distribution, the think tank
estimates, would lose around $1,700 each year.
The
left-of-centre think tank Centre for American Progress, using a different
methodology, has an estimate of a $2,500 to $3,900 loss for a middle-income
family.
Various
researchers have also warned that another major round of tariffs from the US
would risk another spike in domestic inflation.
Impact on
jobs
Yet Trump
has used another economic justification for his tariffs: that they protect and
create US domestic jobs.
“Under my
plan, American workers will no longer be worried about losing your jobs to
foreign nations, instead, foreign nations will be worried about losing their
jobs to America," he said on the campaign trail.
The
political context for Trump’s tariffs was longstanding concern about the loss
of US manufacturing jobs to countries with lower labour costs, particularly
after the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) with
Mexico in 1994 and the entry of China into the World Trade Organisation in
2001.
In January
1994, when Nafta came into effect, the US had just under 17 million
manufacturing jobs. By 2016, this had declined to around 12 million.
Yet
economists say it is misleading to attribute this decline to trade, arguing
that growing levels of automation are also an important factor.
And
researchers who studied the impact of Trump’s first-term tariffs found no
substantial positive effects on overall employment in US industrial sectors
that were protected.
Trump
imposed 25% tariffs on imported steel in 2018 to protect US producers.
By 2020,
total employment in the US steel sector was 80,000, still lower than the 84,000
it had been in 2018.
It is
theoretically possible that employment might have dropped even further without
the Trump steel tariffs but detailed economic studies of their impact on US
steel still showed no positive employment impact.
And
economists have also found evidence suggesting that, because the domestic price
of steel rose after the tariffs were imposed, employment in some other US
manufacturing sectors, which relied on steel as an input - including the
agricultural machinery manufacturer Deere & Co - was lower than it
otherwise would have been.
Impact on
trade deficit
Trump has
criticised America's trade deficit, which is the difference between the value
of all the things the country imports and the value of its exports in a given
year.
“Trade
deficits hurt the economy very badly,” he has said.
In 2016,
just before Trump took office, the total goods and services deficit was $480bn,
around 2.5% of US GDP. By 2020, it had grown to $653bn, around 3% of GDP,
despite his tariffs.
Part of the
explanation, according to economists, is that Trump’s tariffs increased the
international relative value of the US dollar (by automatically reducing demand
for foreign currencies in international trade) and that this made the products
of US exporters less competitive globally.
Another
factor behind this failure to close the trade deficit is the fact that tariffs,
in a globalised economy with multinational companies, can sometimes be
bypassed.
For example,
the Trump administration imposed 30% tariffs on Chinese imported solar panels
in 2018.
The US
Commerce Department presented evidence in 2023 that Chinese solar panel
manufacturers had shifted their assembly operations to countries such as
Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam and then sent the finished products to
the US from those countries, effectively evading the tariffs.
There are
some economists who support Trump’s tariff plans as a way to boost US industry,
such as Jeff Ferry of the Coalition for A Prosperous America, a domestic lobby
group, but they are a small minority of the profession.
Oren Cass,
the director of the conservative think tank American Compass, has argued
tariffs can incentivise firms to keep more of their manufacturing operations in
America, which he argues has national defence and supply chain security
benefits.
And the
Biden/Harris administration, while sharply criticising Trump’s proposed
extension of tariffs, has kept in place many of the ones he implemented after
2018.
It has also
imposed new tariffs on imports of things like electric vehicles from China,
justifying them on the grounds of national security, US industrial policy and
unfair domestic subsidies from Beijing.
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