Há 17 horas
terça-feira, 31 de dezembro de 2024
Many great prime ministers overcome a shaky start – but Keir Starmer’s window is closing fast
Many
great prime ministers overcome a shaky start – but Keir Starmer’s window is
closing fast
Anthony
Seldon
Successful
PMs learn on the job, and Labour’s leader needs to start 2025 by showing his
party and the country he has done so
Wed 1 Jan
2025 07.00 CET
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/jan/01/prime-minister-keir-starmer-labour-leader-2025
The
dismissive verdicts and dire polls after Keir Starmer’s first few months in
power should not unduly perturb him. Britain’s best prime ministers all faced
considerable challenges, especially early on. Clement Attlee may rank as
Labour’s most outstanding leader, but his position was far from secure at the
time and he would have been ousted early but for the loyal support of the
foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. Margaret Thatcher endured many dark weeks and
months, only feeling confident of her position after victory in the Falklands
war, three years into her premiership. The end of year verdicts on Starmer’s
premiership have highlighted his errors and the bad economic news, but they
have precious little positive to offer beyond “he must find a narrative”.
Steady on,
though. Starmer believes he has a narrative, a very clear one that he has
internalised in his head – which is that as Labour leader from 2020, he took a
series of unpopular decisions and faced endless criticism, but he prevailed and
won one of the biggest majorities in history. On the same basis, he thinks that
tough medicine from him now will see the party rewarded with another handsome
majority in 2028 or 2029. It’s neat. It’s compelling. But it’s a fantasy – and
a dangerous misunderstanding of the kind of narrative a PM needs. If Starmer
continues to hold to it he will fall, and Britain will notch up another failed
premiership when what it needs most is competent government.
Prime
ministers lack the time for reflection. All the PMs I have written about regret
the lack of time spent thinking through what they were trying to achieve. They
repeatedly sacrificed strategy to urgency, the mantra to the media. Only in
hindsight do they see this clearly. So what should Starmer do? He could start
by using the few days left before the heat of the political battle reignites to
reflect more on the past year. No previous experience can prepare a prime
minister for life in Downing Street. No prime minister has been the finished
article on arrival. Successful incumbents learn on the job. “The PM doesn’t
seem to understand what the job is,” senior figures in the British state tell
me. Well, prime minister, you need to learn, and quickly.
Most prime
ministers realise too late, if at all, how to do the job. But lessons can be
learned from successful premierships. First, the job is to be captain of the
ship. Starmer agonises over whether he is more chair or chief executive,
preferring the former. Neither designation is right. The job of the prime
minister is to stay on the command deck at all times, surveying the horizon.
Prime ministers go wrong when they try to sort out divisions and details below
decks themselves, or wander off spending too much time abroad. Prime ministers
love to travel, and Starmer has proved adept at forging relationships with
foreign leaders. But any visits should be sparse, strategic and swift. They
must learn to do what only the PM can do.
Next, every
successful prime minister defines a clear direction and purpose for their
government. This is what having a narrative means. The country knew where
Attlee and Thatcher were destined; less so where James Callaghan and David
Cameron were steering the ship, naval man though the former was. Starmer made
light at a pre-Christmas party of having had “seven key pillars, six
milestones” and “five missions”. Joking aside, these multiple lists are a
nonsense, and he must see it. Without one clear direction, premierships are
repeatedly blown off course. This is going to be the year when his real work
starts. There will be more bad economic news, difficult May elections, strikes
in public services, a fraught spending review, and further turbulence from sceptics
in the party. All this before he reckons with the shock waves of a Trump
presidency and an ascendant Reform UK party.
The
government will only stay the course with its focus unequivocally on generating
growth, which barely rose under the Conservatives after 2010. The prime
minister, not the chancellor of the exchequer, is first lord of the Treasury.
For much of the first half of the life of the political office, the PM was the
chancellor – so fundamental is financial health to the whole notion of the
role. Without growth, Starmer’s entire project will flounder. Securing it must
take most of his time. Making business into allies, advancing pro-growth
policies, and bringing top talent into Downing Street; all these need to happen
now.
Starmer’s
single most avoidable error was arriving in Downing Street without his own
cabinet secretary, principal private secretary or national security adviser. He
made unsatisfactory appointments to many other posts too, including his chief
of staff. Bringing back the experienced Jonathan Powell and Liz Lloyd, who
served as chief of staff and deputy chief of staff respectively in Tony Blair’s
No 10, are steps in the right direction. But Starmer needs many more such
accomplished figures whom he can trust. Every successful prime minister in
history had a superb team.
Finally,
Starmer needs to start acting like a prime minister. Second-rate leaders blame
others, as he has repeatedly done with the Conservatives and latterly the civil
service. Sue Gray is blamed for the failure to prepare better for office, and
the lack of clarity once in No 10, but Starmer alone was responsible for Gray’s
appointment as his chief of staff. Anyone who knew her and knew the job could
have told him that, brilliant though she is, she wasn’t right for the role. The
prime minister needs to stop being tribal and hear a wider and better range of
views. He has barely listened to former prime ministers or to others, like the
Institute for Government, who are ready to offer wise counsel.
Other PMs
who had shaky starts went on to make the cut. So can Starmer. He must make it.
But if he has not significantly improved by mid 2025, his own party and the
country may conclude that his uncertain start was not an aberration but an
indication of chronic unsuitability. Were Britain then to have a seventh prime
minister in under 10 years, foreign investors and governments, on whom British
prosperity depends, will draw the same conclusion as increasing numbers at
home: a new leader is needed.
Anthony
Seldon’s Starmer at 10 will be published after he leaves No 10; he is the
author of The Impossible Office? The History of the British Prime Minister
En moins de dix ans, la dette publique a grimpé de plus de 1.000 milliards d'euros. Elle atteint 113,7 % du PIB fin septembre et a augmenté de plus de 71 milliards d'euros en trois mois.
En moins de dix ans, la dette publique a grimpé
de plus de 1.000 milliards d'euros. Elle atteint
113,7 % du PIB fin septembre et a augmenté de plus de 71 milliards d'euros en
trois mois.
Décryptage
: 5 minutes pour comprendre la dette publique
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/decryptage-5-minutes-pour-comprendre-la-dette-publique
À la fin du
deuxième trimestre 2024, la dette publique s’établit à 3 228,4 milliards
d’euros d’après la dernière publication de l’INSEE en date du 27 septembre
2024, soit 112 % du PIB. Selon le baromètre Elabe du 3 octobre dernier, 82 %
des Français jugent urgent de réduire la dette publique en France. Mais,
concrètement, à quoi correspond cette dette ? Comment est-elle générée ? À
l’aide de questions/réponses, on vous aide à mieux comprendre ce sujet.
Sommaire
Décryptage
: 5 minutes pour comprendre la dette publique
Qu’appelle-t-on
dette publique ? Comment la définir ?
Pourquoi
la France doit-elle emprunter ? Et quelles en sont les conséquences ?
Pourquoi
s’endetter ? Quels impacts sur le budget ?
Comment
sont contractés les emprunts ?
Qui
prête à la France ?
Quelle
est la situation en 2023 ?
Ressources
utiles
Qu’appelle-t-on
dette publique ? Comment la définir ?
La dette
publique désigne l’ensemble des emprunts contractés par les administrations
publiques qui ne sont pas encore remboursés.
© Ministères
économiques et financiers - source INSEE
Ces
administrations publiques désignent :
l’État,
les
organismes divers d'administration centrale (ODAC) : il s’agit notamment des
établissements tel que les universités, les musées, etc.
les
administrations publiques locales : cela correspond aux collectivités
territoriales, aux établissements publics locaux, aux organismes consulaires
(CCI, CMA, Chambre d'agriculture), etc.
les
administrations de Sécurité sociale : il s’agit principalement du régime
général et des régimes spéciaux de Sécurité sociale, des régimes d’assurance
chômage, des régimes complémentaires de retraites, des hôpitaux publics, etc.
À savoir
Il existe
plusieurs définitions de la dette publique. Celle que nous utilisons est la
dette des administrations publiques au sens du Traité de Maastricht,
c’est-à-dire selon la comptabilité utilisée par l’Union européenne et ses pays
membres.
Pourquoi la
France doit-elle emprunter ? Et quelles en sont les conséquences ?
© Ministères
économiques et financiers - source INSEE
Tous les
ans, la France se dote d’un budget. Celui-ci correspond à l’ensemble de ses
ressources d’une part, et de ses dépenses d’autre part :
Les
ressources proviennent principalement des impôts et taxes payés par les
citoyens et les entreprises.
Les dépenses
correspondent à l’argent utilisé pour financer l’action publique : éducation,
justice, police, transports, etc.
Depuis
cinquante ans, les dépenses sont supérieures aux recettes : le budget est donc
déficitaire.
Pour
financer cette différence et permettre de continuer à financer l’action
publique, la France contracte des emprunts. L’ensemble de ces emprunts
constitue la dette publique.
Déficit
public et déficit budgétaire, quelles différences ?
Le déficit
budgétaire désigne le déficit du budget de l’État.
Le déficit
public quant à lui désigne le déficit de l’État auquel on ajoute celui de
toutes les administrations publiques, au sens du traité de Maastricht. Il prend
en compte l’État, mais aussi la Sécurité sociale et les collectivités locales.
C’est ce
dernier qui est regardé par l’Union européenne, mais aussi par les agences de
notation. Selon les règles européennes applicables aux pays de la zone euro, ce
déficit doit rester sous la barre des 3 % du PIB.
Pourquoi
s’endetter ? Quels impacts sur le budget ?
La dette a
également un impact sur le budget. Les intérêts payés représentent un coût : on
parle alors de la charge de la dette. En augmentant la dette publique, l’État
augmente aussi ses dépenses. La charge de la dette est un poste important de
dépenses : environ 7 % du budget de l’État.
Cet
endettement peut servir à soutenir l’économie dans les périodes de crise et de
ralentissement de l’activité, ou à financer des investissements utiles pour
l’avenir du pays (innovation, transition écologique, etc.).
En revanche,
une accumulation de dettes comporte des risques : elle canalise l’épargne
privée et limite les investissements privés, limite la capacité à réagir en cas
de crise et renchérit le coût de l’emprunt et conduit à consacrer une part
croissance des ressources aux charges d’intérêt.
Elon Musk Is a National Security Risk
Opinion
Elon Musk
Is a National Security Risk
Dec. 29,
2024
By Russel L.
Honoré
Lt. Gen.
Honoré retired from the U.S. Army in 2008.
It is now
fair to ask the question: Is Elon Musk a national security risk?
According to
numerous interviews and remarks, Mr. Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency
co-leader, Vivek Ramaswamy, once appeared to believe he was. In May 2023, Mr.
Ramaswamy went so far as to publicly state, “I have no reason to think Elon
won’t jump like a circus monkey when Xi Jinping calls in the hour of need,” a
reference to China’s leader. In a separate X post targeting Mr. Musk, he wrote,
“the U.S. needs leaders who aren’t in China’s pocket.”
Mr.
Ramaswamy has since walked back his numerous public criticisms of Mr. Musk, but
he was right to raise concerns. According to news reports, Mr. Musk and his
rocket company, SpaceX, face federal reviews from the Air Force, the Defense
Department’s Office of Inspector General and the under secretary of defense for
intelligence and security for failing to provide details of Mr. Musk’s meetings
with foreign leaders and other potential violations of national-security rules.
These
alleged infractions are just the beginning of my worries. Mr. Musk’s business
ventures are heavily reliant on China. He borrowed at least $1.4 billion from
banks controlled by the Chinese government to help build Tesla’s Shanghai
gigafactory, which was responsible for more than half of Tesla’s global
deliveries in the third quarter of 2024.
China does
not tend to give things away. The country’s laws stipulate that the Communist
Party can demand intelligence from any company doing business in China, in
exchange for participating in the country’s markets.
This means
Mr. Musk’s business dealings in China could require him to hand over sensitive
classified information, learned either through his business interests or his
proximity to President-elect Donald Trump. No federal agency has accused him of
disclosing such material, but as Mr. Ramaswamy put it, China has recognized
that U.S. companies are fickle. He added, “If Xi Jinping says ‘jump,’ they’ll
say, ‘How high?’”
Sign up for
the Opinion Today newsletter Get expert
analysis of the news and a guide to the big ideas shaping the world every
weekday morning. Get it sent to your inbox.
Mr. Musk’s
relationship with China’s leaders could prove a problem for America’s national
security given that SpaceX has a near monopoly on the United States’ rocket
launches. The United States is in an intense space race with China. In a May
interview, Maj. Gen. Gregory J. Gagnon, the deputy chief of space operations
for intelligence at the U.S. Space Force, said that there has never been a
buildup comparable to what the Chinese are attempting in space — not even
during World War II — and that “an adversary arming this fast is profoundly
concerning.” The last thing the United States needs is for China to potentially
have an easier way of obtaining classified intelligence and national security
information.
Mr. Musk
already has a history of pleasing the Chinese Communist Party. He heaped praise
on Mr. Xi to commemorate the party’s 100th anniversary. In 2022, earning thanks
from Chinese officials, he went to bat for the party by arguing that Taiwan
should become a special administrative region of China.
In May 2023,
Mr. Musk also reportedly told Qin Gang, then the Chinese foreign minister, that
Tesla opposed the United States decoupling from China, stating that U.S. and
Chinese interests are “intertwined like conjoined twins.”
Although
claiming to be a free-speech advocate, Mr. Musk was the first foreigner to
contribute an article to China Cyberspace, a magazine that is run by the
Communist regime’s internet censorship agency.
Chris
Stewart, a Republican former congressman and senior member of the House
Intelligence Committee, whom Mr. Trump reportedly considered nominating as
director of national intelligence, once pushed for closed-door briefings on Mr.
Musk’s China ties. Mr. Trump’s choice for secretary of state, Senator Marco
Rubio, who previously accused Tesla of covering up for the Chinese Communist
Party, introduced a bill to prevent NASA and other federal agencies from giving
contracts to companies linked to China or Russia.
The question
now is whether the incoming Trump administration will take this risk seriously.
Mr. Musk is
one of Mr. Trump’s top advisers. Mr. Trump may have gone so far as to reject a
bipartisan congressional budget measure because it did not have Mr. Musk’s
stamp of approval. In November, after his election, Mr. Trump traveled to Texas
to watch Mr. Musk’s Starship launch. That is fine, but doing nothing to ensure
America’s space apparatus remains secure from potential vulnerabilities would
not be.
The
Musk-China concerns might be just the beginning. In a November letter to
Attorney General Merrick Garland and the Pentagon’s inspector general, two
Democratic senators asked that they investigate Mr. Musk’s “reliability as a
government contractor and a clearance holder” because of his reported
conversations with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials. In a separate
letter, the senators asked the Air Force secretary, Frank Kendall, to
reconsider SpaceX’s “outsized role” in America’s commercial space integration.
Mr. Kendall wrote back stating that, while he was legally prohibited from
discussing Mr. Musk’s case, he shared their concerns.
If the
federal investigations demonstrate deep connections to China and Russia, the
federal government should consider revoking Mr. Musk’s security clearance. It
should already be thinking about using alternatives to SpaceX’s launch
services.
The fact
that Mr. Musk spent a quarter of a billion dollars to help re-elect Mr. Trump
does not give the incoming White House the license to look the other way at the
national security risks he may pose. If Mr. Trump and his appointees mean what
they say about getting tough on America’s adversaries, then they will act on
this matter without delay. There is too much at stake to ignore what’s right in
front of them.
Lt. Gen.
Russel L. Honoré led Task Force Katrina after the devastation of New Orleans
and, after retiring from the Army, led a review of security at the U.S. Capitol
after Jan. 6, 2021
Germany’s Olaf Scholz blasts back at Elon Musk in New Year’s address
Germany’s
Olaf Scholz blasts back at Elon Musk in New Year’s address
Billionaire’s
animosity toward German mainstream politicians and his affection for the AfD
could bode poorly for Germany’s next government.
December 31,
2024 1:05 pm CET
By Laura
Hülsemann
https://www.politico.eu/article/elon-musk-afd-versus-germany-olaf-scholz-new-year-election-speech/
Chancellor
Olaf Scholz hit back at tech billionaire Elon Musk for attempting to influence
the outcome of Germany’s snap election on Feb. 23 by endorsing the far-right
party Alternative for Germany (AfD).
“You, the
citizens, decide what happens in Germany,” Scholz said in a New Year’s address
to be broadcast Tuesday, according to a text circulated in advance. “It’s not
up to the owners of social media.”
While Scholz
did not mention Musk by name, it was clear that he was referring to the X
owner. Over the weekend, Musk doubled down on his support for the AfD in an
opinion piece in German newspaper Welt am Sonntag.
The
endorsement sparked a firestorm in Germany, with the government and politicians
across the spectrum accusing Musk of attempting to influence the outcome of the
February election.
“Musk is
strengthening those who are weakening Europe,” Germany’s vice chancellor and
economy minister, Robert Habeck, also said in his New Year’s address.
Musk has
launched a series of attacks on German maintream politicians in recent days
while praising the AfD. In one post, he referred to Scholz as “Oaf Schitz.” In
another, he referred to German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier as an
“anti-democratic tyrant.”
Musk’s
animosity toward German mainstream politicians and his affection for the AfD
could bode poorly for Germany’s next government. Musk is U.S. President-elect
Donald Trump’s most powerful adviser, and his opinions could well have a big
influence on the next White House’s policies when it comes to Germany.
Currently,
Germany’s conservative alliance, led by chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz, is
ahead in polls. Merz has suggested he’d be able to cut “deals” with Trump
should he win the race.
The AfD has
grown increasingly extreme since its founding as a euroskeptic party in 2013.
Germany’s federal domestic intelligence classifies the party as a suspected
extremist organization.
Musk, a tech
billionaire and electric vehicle mogul, first supported the AfD in a tweet two
weeks ago. He has recently also
supported several other European populist, right-wing politicians, such as
Reform UK leader Nigel Farage and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
Scholz, in
his New Year’s speech, said that while the most extreme opinions and loudest
voices get the most attention, “the vast majority of reasonable and decent
people” would decide the outcome of the February election.
segunda-feira, 30 de dezembro de 2024
Azerbaijan Blames Russia for Plane Crash and Rebukes Kremlin
Azerbaijan
Blames Russia for Plane Crash and Rebukes Kremlin
The leader
of Azerbaijan criticized the Russian response to the crash of a passenger jet
that Azerbaijani officials said had most likely been hit by Russian air
defenses.
Anatoly
Kurmanaev
By Anatoly
Kurmanaev
Reporting
from Berlin
Published
Dec. 29, 2024
Updated Dec.
30, 2024, 3:51 a.m. ET
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/world/europe/azerbaijan-blames-russia-plane-crash.html
The leader
of Azerbaijan directly blamed Russia on Sunday for the crash of an Azerbaijan
Airlines passenger jet last week, calling on Moscow to accept responsibility
and offer compensation to victims.
President
Ilham Aliyev said in an interview with Azerbaijan’s national broadcaster that a
vague apology issued by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia a day earlier
would not suffice to preserve friendly relations between the two former Soviet
states.
The Embraer
190 airliner was traveling from Baku, Azerbaijan, to Grozny in southern Russia
on Wednesday, but was diverted from its path after encountering interference
with its navigation systems and impact with external objects, according to
Azerbaijan’s government. The plane crashed in Kazakhstan soon after, resulting
in the deaths of 38 of the 67 people on board, more than half of them
Azerbaijani citizens.
Azerbaijani
and U.S. officials, as well as international aviation experts, had said they
believed that the plane was most likely shot down by a Russian air defense
missile. Moscow, however, has not admitted responsibility.
Mr. Aliyev’s
comments on Sunday offered the most direct rebuke yet of Kremlin’s position on
the crash.
“We can
clearly say today that the plane was shot down by Russia,” Mr. Aliyev said in
the interview, according to a summary published in English by Azerbaijan’s
state news agency. “First, the Russian side must apologize to Azerbaijan.
Second, it must acknowledge its guilt. Third, those responsible must be
punished.”
Mr. Aliyev
added that Moscow had met only the first condition thus far.
On Saturday,
Mr. Putin broke the Kremlin’s three-day silence on the crash. He called Mr.
Aliyev and apologized, without directly acknowledging Russian responsibility,
according to summaries of the call published by the two governments.
“Vladimir
Putin offered his apologies that the tragic incident took place in the Russian
airspace,” the Kremlin said in its summary.
Russia said
that as the plane approached Grozny, Russian air defenses had begun to repulse
an attack by Ukrainian drones on the airport there and others nearby.
Ukraine,
which has targeted Grozny with drones in recent weeks, has not confirmed or
denied that such an attack took place.
Mr. Aliyev
said in the television interview that the airliner was hit by accident. He
criticized, however, Moscow’s tardy and noncommittal response, which initially
attempted to blame the crash on fog or birds.
“Unfortunately,
for the first three days, we heard nothing from Russia except for some absurd
theories,” Mr. Aliyev said.
Analysts
said that Mr. Aliyev had taken a strong stand on Russia because he himself
accepted responsibility and offered compensation when Azerbaijan’s military
mistakenly shot down a Russian military helicopter in 2020, killing two Russian
service members.
“Azerbaijan
now expects similar actions from Moscow,” said Zaur Shiriyev, a Baku-based
foreign policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a
policy research organization.
It remains
unclear if Mr. Aliyev’s strongly worded demands to the Kremlin signaled a
cooling of relations between the two countries, or were meant primarily to
satisfy a domestic audience.
Azerbaijan
has assumed a neutral position on the war in Ukraine, benefiting from growing
trade with Russia while exploiting Moscow’s distraction to pursue its interests
in the Caucasus. Analysts have said the country has little incentive to let the
crash derail this beneficial status quo with Moscow.
Some
analysts have said that Mr. Putin could resolve the flare-up of tensions with
Mr. Aliyev, a fellow autocrat with longstanding ties to Moscow elites, by
striking a private deal.
Such a
scenario would spare Mr. Putin the political cost of assuming responsibility
for the crash but it would be likely to breed long-term resentment against
Russia among the Azerbaijani public, the analysts say.
The Kremlin
did not immediately comment on Mr. Aliyev’s demands on Sunday.
Milana
Mazaeva contributed reporting from Istanbul.
Anatoly
Kurmanaev covers Russia and its transformation following the invasion of
Ukraine. More about Anatoly Kurmanaev
Poland takes EU baton as Tusk braces for pivotal presidential election
Poland
takes EU baton as Tusk braces for pivotal presidential election
May’s vote
on Poland’s next head of state looms large over the country’s six-month EU
presidency, which starts Jan. 1.
By BARBARA
MOENS and WOJCIECH KOŚĆ
December 3,
2024 4:00 am CET
Polish Prime
Minister Donald Tusk will be laser-focused on a presidency in the first half of
next year — but it won’t be the one that allows Poland to shepherd legislation
through the Council of the European Union.
Instead, his
attention will be commandeered by the May Polish presidential election and the
critical task of ensuring a friendly successor to incumbent Andrzej Duda.
Duda, an
ally of the former governing Law and Justice (PiS) party, has missed few
opportunities to undermine Tusk’s credibility and popular support by preventing
his year-old government from carrying out much of its electoral program. He has
even refused to sign off on government candidates for ambassadors.
Tusk’s
centrist Civic Coalition still leads the nationalist PiS in the polls, but this
advantage may not last if the country elects another PiS-backed president who
continues to kneecap the Tusk government until the end of its term in 2027.
The election
comes as Tusk tries to deliver on promises made during last year’s campaign —
such as easing access to abortion or permitting civil partnerships regardless
of gender — while keeping his rainbow coalition with the Polish People’s Party,
Poland 2050 and The Left in line.
These
domestic pressures will constrain Poland in its six-month EU presidency
starting Jan. 1, said Piotr Buras, head of office at the European Council on
Foreign Relations in Warsaw. “The Polish government perceives this election as
absolutely fundamental for the country’s future. This is basically what matters
most for Tusk.”
One EU
diplomat said: “Member states and the Commission are concerned that the Polish
Council presidency will put national interests before European ones, like on
migration, trade, energy or climate protection.
“They are
not seen as an honest broker. It seems to be all about the [Polish]
presidential election.”
Warsaw,
however, downplayed the impact of the presidential election on its turn to set
the agenda in Brussels. “Poland will be [an] honest broker and the most
efficient presidency possible,” Poland’s EU Affairs Minister Adam Szłapka told
POLITICO. “Elections, including the presidential one in Poland, are a natural
part of democracies and won’t affect in any way our work in Brussels.”
Donald
Trump’s return as president of the United States in January — and in particular
his position on Ukraine — could prove a counterweight to domestic political
pressures and force Tusk to pay more attention to events in Brussels.
Together
with the Baltics, Poland has led the charge for the EU to provide more military
and financial support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
Warsaw now fears that Trump’s much-touted peace deal could force Ukraine to
concede land to Russia, thereby emboldening Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions.
This will be
Tusk’s focus during Poland’s Council presidency, said Andrzej Bobinski,
managing director at Polish think tank Polityka Insight, and will require that
he “navigat[e] these difficult waters around Trump, Ukraine, and his leadership
in Europe.”
Polish
Minister Szłapka said his country’s priority for its presidency is “security in
its different dimensions, including [the] external and internal security of the
EU.”
“With
Putin’s war next door, among global tensions and internal challenges, it is
security of the Europeans that is the foundation and the uniting factor,” he
said.
The
question, however, will be how much Poland will (and wants to) move the needle.
Ever since
Tusk — a former president of the European Council — returned to the EU’s top
table last year, Brussels has hoped the Polish prime minister will work with
France and Germany to revalitize the EU.
But the trio
— known as the “Weimar Triangle” — has had only limited success since Tusk’s
return to power, partly because of his national preoccupations. While Tusk did
play a key role in securing Ursula von der Leyen a second mandate as president
of the European Commission, his European counterparts have often felt his
attention is divided. Meanwhile, Paris and Berlin have experienced their own
domestic chaos, with Germany now heading to the polls early next year.
“Will Tusk
now finally take up the gauntlet?” asked one EU official, who was granted
anonymity to discuss sensitive talks.
The Polish
representation to Brussels, not Warsaw, is more likely to drive action at the
EU level over the next six months, diplomats said.
“Tusk paints
politics in very broad strokes,” said Bobinski of Polityka Insight, adding he
doesn’t believe the Polish leader “will have the attention span and the will to
really go deep into Brussels politics.”
There are
also some policy elephants in the room.
Tusk’s
return toppled the nationalist-conservative PiS administration, which had sided
with Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán to thwart various EU agendas. While
the changing of the guard has returned Warsaw to the centrist, pro-European
camp, Poland still finds itself outside the general European consensus on more
delicate files such as EU climate policy.
Overall,
however, the bar for Poland’s presidency is relatively low following Hungary’s
inflammatory turn in the chair. The new European Commission will also still be
gearing up, with legislative proposals not expected to land until later in the
Polish presidency.
“They won’t
do much, but they also won’t disappoint much,” the EU official said.
Barbara
Moens reported from Brussels. Wojciech Kość reported from Warsaw. Dionisios
Sturis contributed reporting from Brussels.
Donald Tusk’s Polish revival masks deeper divisions with German neighbours
.jpeg)
Analysis
Donald
Tusk’s Polish revival masks deeper divisions with German neighbours
Jennifer
Rankin
in Brussels
Warsaw’s
return to the European mainstream with presidency of the EU Council may not be
quite what it seems
Mon 30 Dec
2024 06.00 CET
Germany’s
chancellor appears to be heading for defeat; France’s president is mired in
crisis. But while Europe’s traditional power duo are in the doldrums, there is
a strong, stable and pro-EU leader east of Paris and Berlin – Poland’s prime
minister, Donald Tusk.
For European
officials, it’s a helpful gift of the calendar that Poland takes charge of the
EU Council rotating presidency from 1 January.
Tusk, a
former European Council president, returned as Poland’s prime minister in 2023,
leading a broad coalition that defeated the rightwing populist party Law and
Justice (PiS). One of his first acts was to end a long-festering dispute with
Brussels with a pledge to restore constitutional norms, which unlocked billions
of frozen EU funds. Tusk later showed his influence inside the European Council
of EU leaders, helping to orchestrate the return of his centre-right ally
Ursula von der Leyen as European Commission president.
An EU
presidency is a technical business: chairing hundreds of meetings, setting
agendas. Tusk has no formal role. But symbolism matters. The presidency logo, a
Polish flag entwined with the letters “E” and “U”, is intended to project
Poland’s return to the European mainstream. Tusk’s government, which has
pledged to prioritise security during its six-month stint, is an especially
welcome contrast after the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s rogue
diplomacy during his country’s presidency.
Michał
Wawrykiewicz, a centre-right MEP, affiliated to the governing Civic Coalition,
said: “We are just after the presidency of Hungary, which is the biggest
violator of all of the fundamentals of the European Union. So it is a good time
slot for my country to prove that we are one of the leaders of the European
Union.”
But the
image of harmony regained is not quite what it seems. First, Poland’s
democratic restoration is incomplete. As many as a third of Poland’s 10,000
judges are so-called “neo judges”, according to the Council of Europe – ie
politicised appointees who took office through processes introduced by PiS that
were widely deemed to violate the rule of law. Tusk’s government faces a legal
minefield in restoring independent judges, while the PiS-aligned President
Andrzej Duda is blocking many reforms. “It shows how difficult it is to reverse
the country on the democratic path after such a huge devastation,” said
Wawrykiewicz, a lawyer who campaigned to restore the rule of law before he was
elected as an MEP in 2024.
Duda is
nearing the end of his term limit, so presidential elections likely in May will
be critical in determining whether Tusk’s government can fulfil its promise to
restore the rule of law in Poland. That could affect how Poland runs its
presidency. Some EU insiders contend that Poland’s government is playing it
safe by avoiding putting controversial topics on the EU agenda, such as 2040
carbon reduction targets.
Before Duda
stands down, he could be a helpful bridge to Donald Trump’s White House. Anna
Wójcik, of Kozminski University in Warsaw, said Tusk’s government could use the
“surprising card of President Duda, who has good relations with the
president-elect of the United States”.
More
broadly, Warsaw has a good story to tell Trump, who has fiercely criticised
Nato allies for “not paying their bills”. Poland, already the biggest defence
spender in GDP terms in Nato, is expected to spend 4.7% of its economic output
on defence in 2025. This will be an advantage in Washington and “a way of
proving that Europe can well commit and even over-commit” to Nato goals, Wójcik
said.
During its
EU presidency, Poland is expected to make the case for more European defence
spending, including via EU financing, which could entail joint borrowing. The
European Commission has put the cost of boosting EU defences at a minimum of
€500bn and has promised an options paper on how to raise these funds early in
2025.
Any
agreement on European defence spending will have to go through Europe’s largest
contributor to the EU budget, Germany, where political opposition and legal
constraints make common borrowing deeply problematic. More broadly, despite the
return of a pro-EU government in Warsaw and the epoch-making “turning point”,
the Zeitenwende, in Germany, German-Polish relations are weighed down by
mistrust and recrimination.
Under the
previous PiS government, Poland waged a long-running campaign for reparations
for damage caused by the Nazi invasion and occupation. Germany, meanwhile, was
one of Warsaw’s toughest critics on the politicisation of its courts, helping
to broker an agreement in 2020 that meant EU funds could be frozen over
rule-of-law violations.
In theory,
Tusk’s election should have improved relations, but the mood remains sour.
Berlin was exasperated when in May Tusk joined forces with the Greek prime
minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, to call for a European air defence shield to
protect EU airspace against all incoming threats, described as “a bold
initiative that will send a clear and strong message to our friends and foes”.
Germany dismissed the plan as a nonstarter, objecting to its vast cost and
apparent emphasis on it being made in Europe.
For Tusk,
facing smears from his PiS rivals of being pro-German, that refusal closed down
a positive, future-looking project that could have put relations on a better
path. “There is no agreement on how to solve this conundrum in the
Polish-German relations,” said Piotr Buras, the head of the European Council on
Foreign Relations’ office in Warsaw. “This is a major problem for Tusk because
he is the one who faces accusations that he is too pro-German, so he needs to
make himself more credible to the Polish public opinion by being tough on
Germany.”
Buras thinks
the rest of the EU underestimates how far PiS “redefined the parameters of the
Polish European debate”. Polish support for the EU remains high but has fallen
back from the stratospheric enthusiasm of the recent past: a survey for the
Warsaw-based pollster CBOS showed 77% of respondents in favour of the EU in
April 2024, down from 92% less than two years earlier. Opposition to Ukrainian
refugees in Poland is growing.
“Tusk is
very much under pressure from the opposition, from the PiS, and he needs to be
very, very cautious and he is very cautious,” Buras said. “That sets limits for
some major pro-European, courageous initiatives.”
Jihad and Death The Global Appeal of Islamic State by Olivier Roy
Jihad and
Death
The
Global Appeal of Islamic State
Olivier Roy
Part of the
CERI/Sciences Po. Series
https://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/jihad-and-death/
Everything
you need to know about how Islamic State attracts new followers, by a
world-renowned sociologist of Islam.
How has ISIS
been able to muster support far beyond its initial constituency in the Arab
world and attract tens of thousands of foreign volunteers, including converts
to Islam, and seemingly countless supporters online? In this compelling
intervention into the debate about ISIS’ origins and future prospects, the
renowned French sociologist, Olivier Roy, argues that while terrorism and
jihadism are familiar phenomena, the deliberate pursuit of death has produced a
new kind of radical violence. In other words, we’re facing not a radicalization
of Islam, but the Islamization of radicalism.
Jihad and
Death is a concise dissection of the highly sophisticated narrative mobilised
by ISIS: the myth of the Caliphate recast into a modern story of heroism and
nihilism. According to Roy, this very contemporary aesthetic of violence is
less rooted in the history of Islamic thought than it is entrenched in a youth
culture that has turned global and violent.
Reviews
‘A bravura
outing, pithy, prosecutorial, and informed … Roy writes with verve …
magisterial.’ — The Guardian
‘Roy’s brisk
work is full of imaginative leaps, and that is what gives it value. There has
been too much circular writing about the “mind of the terrorist”, too many
assumptions about their supposed brainwashing. By examining the significance of
death for these jihadists, he can dismantle their manifold confusions.’ — The
Times
‘Olivier Roy
is one of the most interestingly provocative thinkers on modern jihadism. In
this excellent short book, the French academic reiterates his argument that we
are seeing not “the radicalisation of Islam but the Islamisation of
radicalism.”’ — Prospect
‘Mr Roy, a
French authority on Islamism, regards IS as the monstrously inflated product of
its own propaganda; it is, he says, first and foremost a death cult …. He
believes IS’s strongest weapon is people’s fear of it … All this is a
stimulating counterblast to much conventional thinking.’ — The Economist
‘Provocative
… even brilliant.’ — The National
Was the Magdeburg market attack the inevitable product of an anti-politics age?
Was the
Magdeburg market attack the inevitable product of an anti-politics age?
Kenan Malik
Lack of
faith in political leaders is leading the socially disaffected to be seduced by
violence
Sun 29 Dec
2024 09.30 CET
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/dec/29/magdeburg-market-attack-product-anti-politics
Taleb
al-Abdulmohsen, the alleged perpetrator of the horror attack on the Christmas
market in Magdeburg, does not, Germany’s interior minister, Nancy Faeser,
observed, “fit any existing mould”. He had acted in “an unbelievably cruel and
brutal manner, like an Islamist terrorist, though he was clearly ideologically
hostile to Islam”.
Faeser is
not alone in her confusion about how to understand Abdulmohsen.
Born in
Saudi Arabia, Abdulmohsen came to Germany in 2006 for psychiatric training
before applying for asylum. Describing himself as “the most aggressive critic
of Islam in history”, he excoriated German immigration policy for being
insufficiently wary of Muslim asylum seekers, becoming an advocate for the
far-right AfD. The former German chancellor Angela Merkel’s “open borders
policy”, he claimed, was an attempt “to Islamise Europe”.
How could
someone so hostile to Islam carry out a murderous act so redolent of Islamist
terror? For many on the right, especially those in the habit of regurgitating
anti-Muslim bigotry, the answer was simple: whatever the evidence, Abdulmohsen
is an Islamist. Many accused him of practising “taqiyya”, or deception, and the
authorities of being “in denial”. Others saw his views as irrelevant. Being a
foreigner, and from a Muslim-majority country, was sufficient to condemn him as
a deadly threat.
Perhaps the
best way to begin making sense of the seemingly inexplicable horror of the
attack, and the all too predictable responses, is as the intersection of two
developments: the changing character of terrorism and the rise of
“anti-politics” – the sense that all those in power are mendacious, corrupt and
hostile to the needs of ordinary people. And a good place to begin
understanding that intersection is in the work of the French sociologist
Olivier Roy.
A leading
thinker on contemporary radical Islam, Roy has long been critical of
conventional theories of how young Muslims in the west get radicalised.
Abdulmohsen was not a jihadi, whatever the conspiracy-mongers may say;
nevertheless, understanding western jihadism may help throw light on his
actions.
To
understand radical Islam, Roy insists, we need not a “vertical” but a
“transverse” grasp of the issue; to view it not just in terms of Islamic
history or theology but also in comparison to other forms of contemporary
identity movements and political radicalisation.
What gives
shape to contemporary disaffection is the politics of identity
What
initially drives most wannabe jihadis is rarely politics or religion but a
search for something less tangible: identity, meaning, belongingness. There is
nothing new in the youthful search for identity and meaning. What is different
is that we live today in more atomised societies and in an age in which many
feel peculiarly disengaged from mainstream social institutions.
In the past,
social disaffection might have led people to join movements for political
change. Today, most such organisations have disintegrated or seem out of touch.
What gives shape to contemporary disaffection is the politics of identity,
which invites individuals to define themselves in increasingly narrow ethnic or
cultural terms. A generation ago, “radicalised” Muslims might have been more
secular in their outlook, their radicalism expressed through political
campaigning. Now, many vent their disaffection through an intensely, often
murderously, tribal vision of Islam. The key question, Roy suggests, is less
about “the radicalisation of Islam” than about “the Islamisation of
radicalism”.
In this
process, an already degenerate ideology has degenerated even further, jihadism
often transmuting in Europe into “an extension of inner-city gangs” and leading
to the emergence over the past decade of “low-tech” terrorism, in which
everyday objects such as knives and cars become wielded with murderous intent.
The line between ideological violence and sociopathic rage has been all but
erased.
This takes
us to the second significant development: the rise of “anti-politics”.
In his
influential 1989 essay, The End of History, Francis Fukuyama suggested that the
west’s victory in the cold war had brought ideological struggle to a close.
“Idealism”, he wrote, “will be replaced by economic calculation” and the
“endless solving of technical problems”.
Politics in
the post-cold-war world did indeed become less about competing ideologies than
a debate about how best to manage the existing political order. This was the
age of neoliberalism undergirded by a consensus that there was no alternative
to liberal democracy, free-market economics and globalisation.
What
Fukuyama underestimated, though, was the significance of politics and of
collective ideals. “Economic calculation” and “the endless solving of technical
problems” have not, and cannot, replace “ideological struggle”. He also
overestimated the ability of the authorities to solve the technical problems or
improve the lives of their citizens.
The
financial collapse of 2008 spawned a resurgence of political protest and
populist challenges to established authority. From Tunisia to Chile, from
Brazil to Hong Kong, there were, Vincent Bevins suggests in If We Burn, his
history of the 2010s, more people involved in protests worldwide than ever
before. And yet little seemed to change. Anger without change has led to a
growing sense that politics itself is the problem.
We may never
know Abdulmohsen’s motives, or his state of mind as he unleashed his carnage,
but somewhere on his political journey, he seems to have transposed his hatred
of Islam into a hatred of Germany for being insufficiently hostile to Islam.
His sense of being ignored by the political authorities may have drawn him into
an act of nihilistic violence that, like much similar violence, may be
inexplicable in rational terms but is expressive of an anti-politics age, and
rooted in the idea of protest as spectacle, often terrible, murderous
spectacle. “Is there a way to justice in Germany without… indiscriminately
massacring German citizens?” he asked in a striking recent social media post.
He had been “looking for this peaceful path” but “not found it”.
The
insistence that Abdulmohsen must be an Islamist and that “mass immigration is
killing Europe” also emerges from the politics of anti-politics. It is not just
Muslims who are socially disengaged and whose disaffection is shaped by a
narrow sense of identity. Many within white working-class communities are
equally disengaged and angry, and also often view their problems through an
identitarian lens, opening the way for far-right advocates to shape anger in
bigoted ways. This summer’s riots in England showed how quickly disaffection
can become warped and directed against Muslims and migrants.
Wannabe
jihadism, racist populism and individual acts of nihilistic terror can seem
disconnected phenomena but all are in very different ways expressions of
disaffected rage while trapped within the cage of identity in an age of
anti-politics.
Kenan Malik is an Observer columnist
Subscrever:
Mensagens (Atom)
