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The
discussion about the origin of the euro just before the Brexit referendum in
2016 often centered on the UK's decision to opt out of the single currency and
the perceived failures or instability of the Eurozone.
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Key
points of this discussion included: The UK's
Opt-Out: The UK secured a specific opt-out from the single currency
requirements in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. This was framed by some as a
sensible decision that allowed Britain to maintain monetary independence and
avoid the problems faced by Eurozone members. The
Eurozone Crisis: The Greek debt crisis and other financial instability within
the Eurozone in the years leading up to 2016 were frequently cited by the Leave
campaign as evidence of the euro's fundamental flaws and the risks of deeper EU
integration. The argument was that the EU was trying to fix the currency, which
had implications for all member states, and that the UK was better off outside
of this inner circle. Sovereignty:
The origin of the euro was tied to the broader theme of national sovereignty.
The single currency was seen by Eurosceptics as a major transfer of power to EU
institutions, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), which undermined the
ability of national governments (like the UK Parliament and the Bank of
England) to manage their own economy and currency. Economic
Arguments: The Leave campaign argued that the UK economy was stronger outside
the euro, pointing to the flexibility of the pound sterling. The Remain
campaign, while not advocating for joining the euro immediately, argued for the
benefits of access to the single market and economic stability that came with
EU membership. Ultimately,
the debate over the euro served as a powerful illustration for the Leave
campaign that the UK could control its own destiny and avoid the pitfalls
associated with the single currency's governance and economic challenges. United
Kingdom and the euro - Wikipedia The
United Kingdom did not seek to adopt the euro as its official currency for the
duration of its membership of the European Unio...
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Remembering the discussion about the origin of
the Euro, just before the Brexit referendum:
Voices
The euro
was designed to assuage French fear of German power – no wonder it failed
In the
second of a three-part series, The Independent’s founding editor finds that
Germany’s economic relationship with its neighbours came to define the European
Union
Andreas
Whittam Smith
Thursday
26 May 2016 14:34 BST
François
Mitterand, the former French president, believed the single currency would help
other European countries regain power lost to Germany
I argued
yesterday that, before we can decide whether to remain in the European Union
(EU), or to leave it, it is important to understand what sort of thing the EU
is.
In
describing the early history of the European Union and its predecessors, I
sought to show that it was designed largely in the interests of France. And in
turn France’s decisions were driven by its fear of a resurgent Germany.
France,
after all, had been invaded three times by Germany in the previous hundred
years.
I ended
my account with De Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s first application to become a
member. At a press conference, he said: “The Treaty of Rome was concluded
between six continental states, states that are, economically speaking, one may
say, of the same nature. Indeed, whether it be a matter of their industrial or
agricultural production, their external exchanges, their habits or their
commercial clientele, their living or working conditions, there is between them
much more resemblance than difference…
“England
in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her
markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant
countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and
only slight agricultural ones.
“She has
in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.”
This
exaggerated analysis was designed to mask the reality. What De Gaulle was
really saying was that the European Economic Community –or Common Market, as
the EU was then called – had not been created with Britain in mind and France
wouldn’t change its nature now because, rather late in the day, Britain wanted
to participate.
Or, to
put it more succinctly, if Britain comes in, we may lose control.
Admittedly,
the differences between Britain and its continental neighbours are profound. We
are by history Protestant and ‘the Six’, the founding countries, are Catholic
(with the exception of the Netherlands and parts of north Germany).
A
prominent feature of our legal system is the common law, under which judges,
guided by precedents, develop the law as they go along. Continental legal
practice is based on Roman law.
In
Britain, Parliament has been the focal point of the nation for some 800 years,
whereas the parliamentary tradition on the continent is much weaker.
Finally,
we have had a long attachment to free trade, sometimes fanatically so, whereas
trade protection is an old habit on the continent.
As Robert
Tombs, the Cambridge historian describes it in his magnificent 900-page tome,
The English and their History, “In Victorian England, there was a near
consensus over free trade, as much a moral as an economic policy. From the
1820s onwards, there developed a visionary programme to transform the world by
means of free trade…it ran from c1850 to c1930. Britain allowed free access to
its domestic markets to all, including countries such as the United States that
limited British access to theirs.”
The last
time that France was able to control Germany was at the time of the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989.
In French
eyes, Germany divided was reassuringly weak; Germany united would be
frighteningly strong. Faced with this, the French President, François
Mitterrand, came to believe that a single European currency was the only way
for other European countries to regain the sovereignty they
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