John
Kampfner
With the
AfD surging, it could soon be the largest party here. But, if he acts now, that
dark scenario need not come to pass
John
Kampfner is the author of In Search of Berlin and Why the Germans Do It Better
Mon 11
Aug 2025 05.00 BST
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/aug/11/100-days-friedrich-merz-germany-afd
The
passing of the 100-day milestone for any world leader usually denotes the end
of their honeymoon period. Friedrich Merz has not been able to enjoy even a
single day of grace, beginning with the very moment he was supposed to be
elected Germany’s chancellor but wasn’t. On 6 May, as Angela Merkel watched
from the visitors’ balcony, the Bundestag voted and declined to approve its new
leader. For a few hours, chaos ensued, until the second round of voting saw his
chancellorship approved, so the swearing in could proceed.
It was a
symbolic act of defiance, and because it was a secret ballot, it wasn’t clear
how many of the 18 dissenters came from Merz’s Christian Democrats (CDU) or
from their new coalition partners, the Social Democrats (SPD). But it cast a
shadow over the new administration from its inception: this is the government
that nobody wanted – not least its protagonists.
This is
the verdict of most of the media and political class, the so-called Berlin
bubble. Barely a day passes when Merz isn’t mocked as a dead man walking. He is
trying to create a form of mainstream conservatism that is at once modernising
– dealing with Germany’s lamentable embrace of digitisation, tackling
bureaucracy, rebuilding infrastructure – and more culturally conservative. He
is simultaneously accused of conceding too much to the left and of being in bed
with the far right. He is denounced for being both vindictively punitive and
emptily performative to migrants. This relentless drumbeat of negativity is the
German equivalent of the dirge of “broken Britain”.
Merz’s
difficulties do not arise from a single source. They partly emanate from the
way he is portrayed: the starched conservative, thin-skinned and wealthy (an
attribute regarded as suspect in Germany). Some of this is unfair, some of it
is not. He has handled himself with far more restraint and aplomb than
originally predicted. Not that he has received much credit for it.
The
second problem is structural. To avoid political hegemony, every government
must be a coalition. It must share power between parties but also between the
federal centre in Berlin and the 16 regions. During the first 75 years of the
federal republic, compromise was regarded as virtuous. Now it is seen as a mark
of weakness.
Which
brings us to the present day. Trumpism has come to town, and Germany’s
political culture is being infected by the same populist impulses as everywhere
else. New media outlets are blurring the lines between fact and fiction,
destroying careers, and leading mainstream politicians to behave in new ways.
Parliament has become more unruly, and in a country that has long been
synonymous with deliberative politics, MPs and ministers take instantly to
social media with instant judgments on breaking news.
The first
battle of the new hyperpolarised era was played out less than a month ago, just
as parliament was going into recess. The issue was the proposed nomination to
the constitutional court of Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, a judge who holds more
liberal views on abortion than is permitted under Germany’s restrictive
legislation. She was demonised by the press and the political right, leading
some spooked CDU MPs to disappear on holiday early, to deprive her of the
necessary majority. Senior government officials pulled the vote at the last
minute, rather than face an embarrassing defeat. Her decision to withdraw her
candidacy last week led to much fury in the SPD and soul-searching in Merz’s
team. Even some more traditionalist MPs appeared to rue the fact that they had
been swayed by pressure from the far right, and that the coalition had been
undermined.
This
confected scandal forms part of a wider strategy by the Alternative für
Deutschland (AfD) to split, weaken and eventually destroy the CDU, thereby
becoming the largest party by the next election in 2029. Its members are open
about their desire to make it impossible for Merz’s coalition to govern. To get
anything through, Merz must agree it with the SPD. This leaves him vulnerable
to the rightwing drumbeat that he is kowtowing to the “woke left”. This
unnerves those on the right of the CDU, some of whom are urging Merz to abandon
the so-called firewall that prohibits cooperation with the AfD. Any such break
with this rule would give the German far right a potential route back to power
for the first time since the end of the second world war.
Meanwhile,
the AfD’s share of the vote, according to Germany’s generally reliable
pollsters, heads inexorably upwards. The party of the far right is on about
24%, three points above its already-impressive and alarming election result in
March, and only two points below that of the CDU.
The
prospect of the AfD becoming Germany’s largest party is a dark scenario, but it
is not inevitable. Two factors may yet work for the government. The first is
the AfD’s tendency for infighting and overall incompetence. The other is the
personal durability of the chief protagonists, Merz and his SPD deputy
chancellor and finance minister, Lars Klingbeil.
Two terms
the coalition uses in much of its communications are: die politische Mitte (the
centre ground) and handlungsfähig (capable of getting on with it). They don’t
set the pulse racing, but that is deliberate. Merz’s approach is not dissimilar
to that of Keir Starmer in the face of the threat of Reform UK: soldier on and
demonstrate to voters that the day-to-day grind still matters and hope that it
produces rewards.
Merz’s
ministers point to a long list of planned action and legislation, which
includes huge investment in critical infrastructure and security (the defence
ministry now has a department called “expansion”), tightening migration and
speeding up procurement. A scrap with their SPD partners is likely over plans
to cut welfare, particularly the minimum income guarantee, but some form of
compromise is expected in the autumn. Both parties will fight hard over the
detail, if only to reassure their bases that they are sticking to their
principles.
It will
be messy, sometimes dramatic, but the coalition may yet work. Merz and
Klingbeil get on reasonably well – in contrast to the personal feuds that were
a hallmark of Olaf Scholz’s administration. They know their parties may be in
the doldrums, but they also know they will suffer even more if this government
fails to deliver. There is nothing like jeopardy to concentrate the mind, not
just for 100 days, but for the next four years.
John
Kampfner is the author of In Search of Berlin and Why the Germans Do It Better
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