March 6,
2022
Why Vladimir Putin is losing the information war
to Ukraine
By Anders
Åslund
Vladimir
Putin has long enjoyed a reputation as a master of information warfare. Over
the past decade, his weaponization of social media and aggressive promotion of
fake narratives have proven pivotal in a range of landmark achievements such as
the 2014 seizure of Crimea and the 2016 election of Donald Trump.
This makes
the current state of affairs all the more surprising. With Putin’s Ukraine
invasion still less than two weeks old, it is already clear that the
information war has been decisively lost.
Since
Putin’s attack began on February 24, the world has rallied overwhelmingly in
support of Ukraine. The vast majority of the international community have also
vocally condemned Russian aggression. Indeed, the war is being widely touted as
the most black-and-white issue of good versus evil in modern history.
Putin’s
invasion has clearly made Russia toxic in ways that even his formidable
disinformation machine has been unable to counter. It has led to unprecedented
international sanctions and persuaded many of the world’s biggest companies to
cut all ties with the country. Even formerly reliable partners like China
appear increasingly unwilling to stand publicly with the Kremlin.
Meanwhile,
false Russian narratives are no longer being given equal space in the
international media or allowed to pass unchallenged. Putin’s attempts to
justify his invasion have notably failed to gain significant traction. Instead,
his increasingly unhinged rants about Ukrainian “neo-Nazis” and “drug addicts”
have been widely ridiculed or simply dismissed.
Faced with
the reality of a catastrophic defeat on the information front, Putin has
retreated and is now embarking on a desperate scramble to protect his grip on
domestic Russian audiences. During the first ten days of the war, Moscow has
banned Facebook and Twitter, shut down most of the country’s remaining
independent media outlets, and introduced draconian new laws promising long
prison sentences for anyone who dares to question the Kremlin’s Orwellian party
line regarding the war in Ukraine.
After years
of success, why is Putin now losing the information war so comprehensively?
One of the
key differences between the current war and the Russian invasion of 2014 is the
presence of large numbers of international correspondents in Ukraine. Thanks
largely to the Biden Administration’s policy of steadily releasing details of
Putin’s invasion plans, the watching world knew well in advance that a major
conflict may be about to break out. As a consequence, representatives of the
international media began gathering in Ukraine in late 2021.
By early
February, many of Kyiv’s top hotels were full of journalists and camera crews
from all over the world. This influx has also seen reporters heading out to
regional capitals like Kharkiv, Lviv, Mariupol and Odesa in large numbers.
The
unprecedented international media presence in Ukraine has enabled hundreds of
journalists to encounter the reality of the country for themselves. In
contrast, previous Ukrainian news stories were typically covered by Moscow
bureaus, with only a handful of stringers actually residing in Kyiv. This led
to a Moscow-centric view of Ukrainian affairs, with bureau chiefs often giving
far too much weight to Kremlin narratives while favoring the condescending
conclusions of their Russian colleagues.
In
contrast, the Western journalists who flocked to Ukraine in the months leading
up to the outbreak of hostilities were largely free of Russian biases and soon
began to redefine international coverage of the country. Crucially, they were
not in any way beholden to the Kremlin, unlike Moscow correspondents who must
secure Russian state accreditation if they wish to keep their jobs.
The Kremlin
enjoys keeping its foreign correspondents on a relatively short leash.
Moscow-based international journalists tend to receive very limited direct
access to senior officials and are often forced to rely on spoon-fed
information. Any correspondent who tells inconvenient truths runs the risk of
expulsion, as has happened to Luke Harding of The Guardian and the BBC’s Sarah
Rainsford. Faced with the very real prospect of losing their livelihoods, many
Moscow correspondents engage in self-censorship and quickly learn to avoid
taboo subjects.
The media
climate in Ukraine is strikingly different. While the Ukrainian media landscape
remains dominated by oligarch interests and is prone to highly partisan
reporting, it is light years away from the strict state censorship of the
Kremlin-controlled Russian media. Instead, Ukraine’s many different media
outlets compete with each other to create an imperfect but pluralistic media
market.
Thanks to
this remarkably free and robust information environment, international
journalists in Ukraine have been able to engage with a wide range of local
colleagues in order to form a well-rounded picture of the true situation in the
country. This interaction has also helped to underline the common professional
ethics and shared values that connect Ukrainians and their Western peers.
Dramatic
recent improvements in international media coverage of Ukraine are only part of
the reason behind Russia’s resounding information war defeat.
The most
important single factor remains the fundamental weakness of Putin’s own
narrative. His claim to be eradicating “Nazism” in a country with a Jewish
president where far-right parties consistently poll in the low single digits is
self-evidently absurd. To make matters worse, the war crimes committed by his
troops in Ukraine have sickened the world.
While Putin
has become a pariah, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has emerged as a
global hero. Zelenskyy’s sensible and straightforward daily briefings and his
memorable selfie videos have been a revelation, while iconic quotes such as “I
need ammunition, not a ride” have already entered history. In contrast to
Putin’s obvious lies, Zelenskyy comes across as sincere and candid. He does not
isolate himself or force colleagues and members of the media to sit at the
opposite end of ten-meter-long tables.
If
Zelenskyy is the undoubted star of Ukraine’s information war effort, other
Ukrainian officials have also performed excellently. Foreign Minister Dmytro
Kuleba has been a prominent and effective presence on social media, as has
Minister for Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov.
Ukraine’s
military has stepped up to the challenge with regular updates and clear,
coherent messaging. They have been supported by Ukraine’s vast and vibrant
civil society, which has served as an informal infowar army posting credible
updates on military engagements and Russian atrocities along with inventive
memes and morale-boosting patriotic messages.
Putin may
yet achieve temporary military dominance over Ukraine through the use of
overwhelming force, but it is far from clear how he could hope to convert this
into a sustainable political settlement. The infowar is already lost, while the
savagery of the Russian assault has poisoned bilateral relations for decades to
come.
As an iron
curtain of repression falls on Putin’s Russia, international media
organizations should already be looking ahead to the future post-war period. If
Ukraine emerges from the current conflict unconquered, regional correspondent
bureaus should abandon the suffocating atmosphere of Moscow and relocate to
Kyiv, where the climate of media freedoms and an absence of political pressure
will allow them to cover the wider region with far greater truth and accuracy.
Anders
Åslund is a Senior Fellow at the Stockholm Free World Forum.
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