Europe’s
‘century of humiliation’ could be just beginning
Donald
Trump is using America’s military and technological superiority to force
one-sided deals on Europe.
Brendan
Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images
August
26, 2025 7:55 pm CET
By
Antonia Zimmermann
https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-century-of-humiliation-could-be-just-beginning/
BRUSSELS
— After its defeat by the British in the First Opium War, the Qing dynasty
signed a treaty in 1842 that condemned China to more than 100 years of foreign
oppression and colonial control of trade policy.
It was
the first of what came to be known as “unequal treaties,” where the bullying
military and technological heavyweight of the day imposed one-sided terms to
try to slash back its massive trade deficit.
Sound
familiar? Fast-forward nearly two centuries, and the EU is starting to
understand exactly how that feels.
European
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s dash to Donald Trump’s Turnberry
golf resort in Scotland last month to seal a highly unbalanced trade deal has
raised fears among politicians and analysts that Europe has lost the leverage
that it once thought it had as a leading global trade power.
Von der
Leyen’s critics were quick to assert that accepting Trump’s 15 percent tariff
on most European goods amounted to an act of “submission,” a “clear-cut
political defeat for the EU,” and an “ideological and moral capitulation.”
If she
had hoped that would keep the U.S. president at bay, a rude awakening was in
store. With the ink barely dry on the trade deal, Trump doubled down on Monday
by threatening to impose new tariffs on the EU over digital regulations that
would hit America’s tech giants. If the EU didn’t fall into line, the U.S.
would stop exporting vital microchip technologies, he warned.
His
diatribe came less than a week after Brussels believed it had won a written
guarantee from Washington that its digital rulebook — and sovereignty — were
safe.
Trump can
wield this coercive advantage because — just like the 19th century British
imperialists — he holds the military and technological cards, and is well aware
his counterpart lags miles behind in both sectors. He knows Europe doesn’t want
to face Russian President Vladimir Putin without U.S. military back-up and
can't cope without American chip technology, so he feels he can dictate the
trade agenda.
EU Trade
Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič strongly implied last month that the deal with the
U.S. was a reflection of Europe’s strategic weakness, and its need for U.S.
support. “It’s not only about … trade: It’s about security, it is about
Ukraine, it is about current geopolitical volatility,” he explained.
The trade
deal is a “direct function of Europe’s weakness on the security front, that it
cannot provide for its own military security and that it failed to invest, for
20 years, in its own security,” said Thorsten Benner, director at the Global
Public Policy Institute in Berlin, who also pointed to failures to invest in
“technological strength” and to deepen the single market.
Just like
the Qing leadership, Europe also scorned the warning signs over many years.
“We are
paying the price for the fact we ignored the wake-up call we got during the
first Trump administration — and we went back to sleep. And I hope that this is
not what we are doing now,” Sabine Weyand, director-general for trade at the
European Commission, told a panel at the European Forum Alpbach on Monday. She
was speaking before Trump’s latest broadside on tech rules.
It is
clear that Trump’s volatile tariff game is far from over, and the 27-nation
bloc is bound to face further political affronts and unequal negotiating
outcomes this fall. To prevent the humiliation from becoming entrenched, the EU
faces a huge task to reduce its dependence on the U.S. — in defense, technology
and finance.
Stormy
waters
The
Treaty of Nanking, signed under duress in 1842 aboard the HMS Cornwallis, a
British warship anchored in the Yangtze River, obliged the Chinese to cede the
territory of Hong Kong to British colonizers, pay them an indemnity, and agree
to a “fair and reasonable” tariff. British merchants were authorized to trade
at five “treaty ports” — with whomever they wanted.
The Opium
War began what China came to lament as its “century of humiliation.” The
British forced the Chinese to open up to the devastating opium trade to help
London claw back the yawning silver deficit with China. It’s an era that still
haunts the country and drives its strategic policymaking both at home and
internationally.
A key
factor forcing the Qing dynasty to submit was its failure to invest in military
and technological progress. Famously, China’s Qianlong Emperor told the British
in 1793 that China did not require the “barbarian manufactures” of other
nations. While gunpowder and firearms were Chinese inventions, a lack of
experimentation and innovation slowed their development — meaning Qing weapons
were about 200 years behind British arms in design, manufacture and
technology.
Similarly,
the EU is now being punished for falling decades behind the U.S. Slashing
defense spending after the Cold War kept European countries dependent on the
U.S. military for security; complacency about technological developments means
the EU is now behind its global rivals in almost all critical technologies.
U.S.
Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, for his part, has declared the beginning
of a new world order — one he dubbed the “Turnberry system” — comparing the
U.S.-EU trade accord to the post-war financial system devised at the New
England resort of Bretton Woods in 1944.
Turbulence
ahead
With his
attack on Monday, Trump demonstrated scant regard for the EU’s desire to
bracket out sensitive issues from last week’s non-binding joint statement. The
vagueness of the four-page text, meanwhile, leaves room for him to press new
demands or threaten retaliation if he deems the EU is failing to keep its side
of the bargain.
More
humiliation could follow as the two sides try to work out various details —
from a tariff quota system on steel and aluminum to exemptions for certain
sectors — that still need to be settled.
“This
deal is so vague that there are so many points where conflicts could easily be
escalated to then be used as justification for why other things will not follow
through,” said Niclas Poitiers, a research fellow at the Bruegel think tank.
Asked
what would happen if the EU were to fail to invest a pledged $600 billion in
the U.S., Trump said earlier this month: “Well, then they pay tariffs of 35
percent.”
It’s a
danger the EU is acutely aware of. The European Commission argues the $600
billion figure simply reflects broad intentions from the corporate sector that
can't be enforced by bureaucrats in Brussels.
But Trump
could well use the investment pledge as a trigger point to gun for higher
duties.
“We do
expect further turbulence,” said a senior EU official, granted anonymity to
speak candidly. But “we feel we have a very clear insurance policy.”
What’s
more, by accepting the agreement, sold by the EU executive as the “less bad”
option following Trump’s tariff threats, Brussels has also shown that blackmail
works. Beijing will be watching developments with interest — just as EU-China
ties have hit a new low and Beijing’s dominance on the minerals the West needs
for its green, digital and defense ambitions hand it immense geopolitical
leverage.
Escaping
irrelevance
But what,
if anything, can the bloc do to avoid prolonging its period of geopolitical
weakness?
In the
lead-up to the deal, von der Leyen repeatedly emphasized that the EU’s strategy
in dealing with the U.S. should be built on three elements: readying
retaliatory measures, diversifying trade partners, and strengthening the bloc’s
single market.
For some,
the EU needs to see the deal as a wake-up call to usher in deep change and
boost the bloc’s competitiveness through institutional reform, as outlined last
year in landmark reports penned by former European Central Bank head Mario
Draghi and former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta.
In
response to the deal, Draghi issued a strongly-worded warning that Trump’s
evident ability to force the bloc into doing his bidding is conclusive proof
that it faces irrelevance, or worse, if it can’t get its act together. He also
played up the failings on security: “Europe is ill-equipped in a world where
geo-economics, security, and stability of supply sources, rather than
efficiency, inspire international trade relations,” he said.
Eamon
Drumm, a research analyst at the German Marshall Fund, also took up that theme.
“Europe needs to think of its business environment as a geopolitical asset to
be reinforced,” he said.
To do so,
investments in European infrastructure, demand and companies are needed, Drumm
argued: “This means bringing down energy prices, better putting European
savings to use for investment in European companies, and completing capital
markets integration.”
In
comments to POLITICO, French Europe Minister Benjamin Haddad also called for
“investing massively in AI, quantum computing and green technologies, and
protecting our sovereign industries, as the Americans do not hesitate to do.”
Free
trade
For
others, the answer lies in deepening and diversifying the bloc’s trade ties —
Brussels insists the publication of its trade deal with the Mercosur bloc of
South American countries is just around the corner, and it is eyeing deals with
Indonesia, India and others this year. It has also signaled openness to
intensifying trade with the Asia-focused CPTPP bloc, which counts Canada,
Japan, Mexico, Australia and others as members.
“In
addition to modernizing the [World Trade Organization], the EU must indeed
focus on continuing to build its network of trade agreements with reliable
partners,” said Bernd Lange, a German Social Democrat who heads the European
Parliament’s trade committee.
“To
stabilize the rules-based trading system, we should find a common position with
democratically constituted countries,” Lange added.
Europe,
Drumm said, faces a choice.
“Is it
going to reinforce its position as a hub of free trade in a world where
globalization is unwinding?” he asked. “Or is it just going to be a battlefield
on which increasing competition between China and the United States plays out?”


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